Detection based Defense against Adversarial Examples from the
  Steganalysis Point of View by Liu, Jiayang et al.
Detection based Defense against Adversarial Examples from the Steganalysis
Point of View
Jiayang Liu, Weiming Zhang, Yiwei Zhang, Dongdong Hou, Yujia Liu, Hongyue Zha and Nenghai Yu
CAS Key Laboratory of Electromagnetic Space Information
University of Science and Technology of China
Hefei, China
Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have recently led to signifi-
cant improvements in many fields. However, DNNs are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples which are samples with im-
perceptible perturbations while dramatically misleading the
DNNs. Moreover, adversarial examples can be used to per-
form an attack on various kinds of DNN based systems,
even if the adversary has no access to the underlying model.
Many defense methods have been proposed, such as obfuscat-
ing gradients of the networks or detecting adversarial exam-
ples. However it is proved out that these defense methods are
not effective or cannot resist secondary adversarial attacks.
In this paper, we point out that steganalysis can be applied
to adversarial examples detection, and propose a method to
enhance steganalysis features by estimating the probability
of modifications caused by adversarial attacks. Experimen-
tal results show that the proposed method can accurately de-
tect adversarial examples. Moreover, secondary adversarial
attacks cannot be directly performed to our method because
our method is not based on a neural network but based on
high-dimensional artificial features and FLD (Fisher Linear
Discriminant) ensemble.
Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have recently led to signif-
icant improvements in many fields, such as image classifi-
cation (Russakovsky et al. 2015; He et al. 2016) and speech
recognition (Amodei et al. 2016). However, the generaliza-
tion properties of the DNNs have been recently questioned
because these machine learning models are vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples (Szegedy et al. 2014). An adversarial ex-
ample is a slightly modified sample that is intended to cause
an error output of the DNN based model. In the context of
classification task, the adversarial example is crafted to force
a model to classify it into a class different from the legitimate
class. In addition, adversarial examples have cross-model
generalization property (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2015), so the attacker can even generate adversarial exam-
ples without the knowledge of the DNN. Adversarial attacks
are divided into two types: targeted attack and untargeted
attack. In targeted attack, the attacker generates adversarial
examples which are misclassified by the classifier into a par-
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ticular class. In untargeted attack, the attacker generates ad-
versarial examples which are misclassified by the classifier
into any class as long as it is different from the true class.
There are many studies which focus on methods of gener-
ating adversarial examples. Some attack methods are based
on calculating the gradient of the network, such as Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2015), Iterative Gradient Sign Method (IGSM)
(Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017) and Jacobian
Saliency Map Attack Method (Papernot et al. 2016a). While
other methods are based on solving optimization prob-
lems, such as L-BFGS (Szegedy et al. 2014), Deepfool
(Moosavidezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2015) and Carlini &
Wagner (C&W) attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017b).
Many defenses are proposed to mitigate adversarial exam-
ples against the above attacks. They make it harder for the
adversary to craft adversarial examples using existing tech-
niques or make the DNNs still give correct classifications
on adversarial examples. These defenses are mainly divided
into two categories.
One way is preprocessing the input image before classi-
fication, taking advantage of the spatial instability of adver-
sarial examples. Defenders can perform some operations on
the input image in spatial domain before giving the input im-
age to a DNN, such as JPEG compression, scaling, adding
noise, etc. Gu et al. (Gu and Rigazio 2015) propose to use
an autoencoder to remove adversarial perturbations from in-
puts.
The other way is to modify the network architecture, the
optimization techniques or the training process. Goodfellow
et al. (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) propose to
augment the training set with adversarial examples to in-
crease the model’s robustness against a specific adversarial
attack. However, this approach faces difficulties because the
dimension of the images and features in networks means an
unreasonable quantity of training data is required. Zheng et
al. (Zheng et al. 2016) propose to append a stability term
to the objective function to force the model to have similar
outputs for normal images of the training set and their ad-
versarial examples. This is different from data augmentation
because it encourages the smoothness of the model output
between original and adversarial samples. Defensive distil-
lation (Papernot et al. 2016b) is another technique against
certain adversarial attacks. This form of network can pre-
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vent the model from fitting too tightly to the original data.
Unfortunately, most of these defenses are not very effective
against adversarial examples in classification tasks.
Obfuscated gradients appear to be robust against adversar-
ial attacks. Obfuscated gradients can be defined as a special
case of gradient masking (Papernot et al. 2017), in which the
attackers cannot compute out the feasible gradient to gen-
erate adversarial examples. However, Athalye et al. (Atha-
lye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018) proposed attack techniques
to overcome the obfuscated gradient based defenses.
Due to the difficulty of classifying adversarial exam-
ples correctly, recent work has turned to detecting them.
Hendrycks & Gimpel (Hendrycks and Gimpel 2016) use
PCA to detect natural images from adversarial examples,
finding that adversarial examples place a higher weight on
the larger principal components than normal images. Li et al.
(Li and Li 2017) apply PCA to the values after inner convo-
lutional layers of the neural network, and use a cascade clas-
sifier to detect adversarial examples. Grosse et al. (Grosse et
al. 2017) propose a variant on adversarial re-training. They
introduce a new class in the model solely for the adversar-
ial examples, and train the network to detect adversarial ex-
amples. Gong et al. (Gong, Wang, and Ku 2017) construct
a very similar defense technique as Grosse’s defense. Met-
zen et al. (Metzen et al. 2017) propose to add a detection
subnetwork which observes the state of the original classi-
fication network, one can tell whether it has been presented
with an adversarial example or not. Lu et al. (Lu, Issaranon,
and Forsyth 2017) detect adversarial examples by hypothe-
sizing that adversarial examples produce different patterns
of ReLU activations in networks than what is produced by
normal images.
Unfortunately, Carlini & Wagner perform experiments to
prove that most of these detecting methods are only effective
on image databases with small size or only several classes.
Moreover, Grosse’s, Gong’s and Metzen’s defenses use a
second neural network to classify images as normal or ad-
versarial. However, neural networks used for detecting ad-
versarial examples can also be bypassed (Carlini and Wag-
ner 2017a). In fact, given an adversarial method can fool
the original neural network, Carlini et al. show that with a
similar method we can also fool the extended network for
detection, which we call secondary adversarial attacks.
In this paper we propose to detect adversarial examples
from the view of steganalysis (Pevny, Bas, and Fridrich
2010) which is the technology for detecting steganography.
In fact, Goodfellow et al. (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2015) have provided the insight on one essence of adversar-
ial examples such that “the adversarial attack can be treated
as a sort of accidental steganography”. Furthermore, we pro-
pose a method to enhance steganalysis features by estimat-
ing the probability of modifications caused by adversarial at-
tacks. Experimental results show that the proposed method
can accurately detect adversarial examples. Moreover, sec-
ondary adversarial attacks cannot be directly performed to
our method because our method is not based on a neural net-
work but based on high-dimensional artificial features and
FLD (Fisher Linear Discriminant) ensemble.
Related Work
Adversarial Attacks
Fast Gradient Sign Method Goodfellow et al. (Goodfel-
low, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) propose the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) for generating adversarial examples.
This method uses the derivative of the loss function of the
model pertaining to the input feature vector. Given the in-
put image X , FGSM is to perturb the gradient direction of
each feature by the gradient. Then the classification result
of the input image will be changed. For a neural network
with cross-entropy cost function J(X, y) where X is the in-
put image and yt is the target class for the input image, the
adversarial example is generated as
Xadv = X − sign(∇XJ(X, yt)) (1)
where  is a parameter to determine the perturbation size.
Iterative Gradient Sign Method The Iterative Gradient
Sign Method (IGSM) is the iterative version of FGSM. This
method applies FGSM many times with small perturbation
size instead of applying adversarial noise with one large per-
turbation size. The adversarial example of the iterative gra-
dient sign method is generated as
Xadv0 = X,
XadvN+1 = ClipX,{XadvN −αsign(∇XJ(XadvN , yt))}
(2)
where ClipX,{X ′} represents a clipping of the values
of the adversarial example. So the results are within -
neighbourhood of the input image X . This attack is more
powerful because the attacker can control how far the ad-
versarial example past the classification boundary. It was
demonstrated that the attack of IGSM was better than
FGSM on ImageNet-1000 (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Ben-
gio 2017).
Deepfool Deepfool is an untargeted attack method to gen-
erate an adversarial example by iteratively perturbing an
image (Moosavidezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2015). This
method explores the nearest decision boundary. The image
is modified a little to reach the boundary in each iteration.
The algorithm stops once the modified image changes the
classification of the network.
Carlini & Wagner Method This method is named after
its authors (Carlini and Wagner 2017b). The attack can be
targeted or untargeted, and has three metrics to measure its
distortion (l0 norm, l2 norm and l∞ norm). The authors point
out that the untargeted l2 norm version has the best perfor-
mance. It generates adversarial examples by solving the fol-
lowing optimization problem:
minimize
δ
‖δ‖2 + c · f(x+ δ)
s.t. x+δ ∈ [0, 1]n
(3)
This attack is to look for the smallest perturbation mea-
sured by l2 norm and make the network classify the image
incorrectly at the same time. c is a hyperparameter to bal-
ance the two parts of equation (3). The best way to choose
c is to use the smallest value of c for which the resulting so-
lution x + δ has f (x+ δ) ≤ 0. f(x) is the loss function to
measure the distance between the input image and the ad-
versarial image. f(x) is defined as:
f(x) = max(Z(x)true − max
i6=true
{Z(x)i},−κ) (4)
Z(x) is the pre-softmax classification result vector. κ is
a hyper-parameter called confidence. Higher confidence en-
courages the attack to search for adversarial examples that
are stronger in classification confidence. High-confidence
attacks often have larger perturbations and better transfer-
ability to other models. The C&W method is a strong attack
which is difficult to defend.
Robustness Based Defense
Robustness based defense aims at classifying adversarial ex-
amples correctly. There are many methods to achieve robust-
ness based defense. Adversarial training is to train a better
network by using a mixture of normal and adversarial exam-
ples in the training set for data augmentation, which we refer
to as adversarial training (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2015). Preprocessing the input images is to perform some
operations to remove adversarial perturbations, such as prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA) (Bhagoji, Cullina, and Mit-
tal 2017), JPEG compression (Das et al. 2017), adding noise,
cropping, rotating and so on. Defensive distillation hides the
gradient between the pre-softmax layer and softmax outputs
by leveraging distillation training techniques (Papernot et
al. 2016b). Obfuscated gradients make the attackers hard to
compute out the feasible gradient to generate adversarial ex-
amples (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018).
Detection Based Defense
Detection based defense aims at distinguishing normal im-
ages and adversarial examples.
Hendrycks & Gimpel (Hendrycks and Gimpel 2016) use
PCA to detect natural images from adversarial examples,
finding that adversarial examples place a higher weight on
the larger principal components than normal images. How-
ever, the Hendrycks defense is only effective for MNIST.
Li et al. (Li and Li 2017) apply PCA to the values af-
ter inner convolutional layers of the neural network, and use
a cascade classifier to detect adversarial examples. Specifi-
cally, they propose building a cascade classifier that accepts
the input as natural only if all classifiers accept the input, but
rejects it if any do. However, Carlini & Wagner perform ex-
periments to prove that Li’s defense fails against the C&W
attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017a).
Grosse et al. (Grosse et al. 2017) propose a variant on ad-
versarial re-training. Instead of attempting to classify the ad-
versarial examples correctly, they introduce the (N + 1) th
class, solely for adversarial examples, and train the network
to detect adversarial examples. Gong et al. (Gong, Wang,
and Ku 2017) construct a very similar defense technique.
However, Carlini & Wagner re-implement these two de-
fenses and find that they are only effective for MNIST (Car-
lini and Wagner 2017a).
Metzen et al. (Metzen et al. 2017) detect adversarial ex-
amples by looking at the inner convolutional layers of the
network. They augment the classification neural network
with a detection neural network that takes its input from var-
ious intermediate layers of the classification network. How-
ever, this defense is only effective against CIFAR-10.
Lu et al. (Lu, Issaranon, and Forsyth 2017) hypothe-
size that adversarial examples produce different patterns of
ReLU activations in networks than what is produced by
normal images. Based on this hypothesis, they propose the
Radial Basis Function SVM (RBF-SVM) classifier which
takes advantage of discrete codes computed by the late stage
ReLUs of the network to detect adversarial examples on
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-1000.
For practical applications, we can deploy detection based
defense combing with robustness based defense. First of all,
we use detection based defense to detect the input image. If
it is a normal image, we will directly feed it to the original
DNN. Otherwise we can take advantage of robustness based
defense to mitigate adversarial examples.
Proposed Method
Both adversarial attacks and steganography make perturba-
tions on the pixel values, which alter the dependence be-
tween pixels. However, steganalysis can effectively detect
modifications caused by steganography by modeling the de-
pendence between adjacent pixels in natural images. So we
can also take advantage of steganalysis to identify deviations
due to adversarial attacks.
Assuming that we have known the attacking method used
by the attacker, we construct a detector to detect whether the
input image is an adversarial example or not. In practice, we
don’t know the method used by the attacker, but we can de-
ploy a series of detectors trained for various mainstream ad-
versarial attacks. Our detection method exploits the fact that
the perturbation of pixel values by adversarial attack alters
the dependence between pixels. By modeling the differences
between adjacent pixels in natural images, we can identify
deviations due to adversarial attacks. In the beginning, we
use a filter to suppress the content of the input image. Depen-
dence between adjacent pixels of the filtered image is mod-
eled as a higher order Markov chain (Sullivan et al. 2005).
Then the transition probability matrix is used as a vector fea-
ture for a feature based detector implemented using machine
learning algorithms.
We recommend two kinds of steganalysis feature sets for
detecting adversarial examples: one is the low-dimensional
model SPAM with 686 features (Pevny, Bas, and Fridrich
2010); the other is the high-dimensional model Spatial Rich
Model (SRM) with 34671 features (Fridrich and Kodovsky
2012).
Features Extraction
SPAM SPAM is described as follows. First, the model cal-
culates the transition probabilities between pixels in eight di-
rections {←,→, ↓, ↑,↖,↘,↙,↗} in the spatial domain.
The differences and the transition probability are always
computed along the same direction. For example, the hor-
izontal direction from left-to-right differences are calculated
by A→i,j = Xi,j − Xi,j+1, where X is an image with size
of m × n, and Xi,j is the pixel at the position (i, j) for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. Second, to model
pixel dependence along the eight directions, a Markov chain
is used between pairs of differences (first order chain) or
triplets (second order chain). The first-order detecting fea-
tures, F 1st, model the difference arrays A by a first-order
Markov process. For the horizontal direction, this leads to
M→x,y = Pr(A
→
i,j+1 = x|A→i,j = y) (5)
where x, y ∈ {−T, . . . , T}. The second-order detecting fea-
tures, F 2nd, model the difference arraysA by a second-order
Markov process. For the horizontal direction, this leads to
M→x,y,z = P (A
→
i,j+2 = x|A→i,j+1 = y,A→i,j = z) (6)
where x, y, z ∈ {−T, . . . , T}. For dimensionality reduction
of the transition probability matrix, only differences within a
limited range are considered. Thus, the transition probability
matrix is calculated just for pairs within [−T, T ]. We sepa-
rately average the horizontal and vertical matrices and then
the diagonal matrices to form the final feature sets, F 1st,
F 2nd. The expression of the average sample Markov transi-
tion probability matrices is
F1,...,k = (M
→ +M← +M↑ +M↓)/4
Fk+1,...,2k = (M
↗ +M↙ +M↘ +M↖)/4
(7)
where k = (2T + 1)2 for the first-order detecting features
and k = (2T + 1)3 for the second-order detecting features.
We can see that the order of Markov model and the range
of differences T control the dimensionality of our detecting
model. We use T = 3 for second order, resulting in 2k =
686 features (Pevny, Bas, and Fridrich 2010).
Spatial Rich Model Spatial Rich Model (SRM) can be
viewed as an extended version of SPAM by extracting resid-
uals from images (Fridrich and Kodovsky 2012). A resid-
ual is an estimate of the image noise component obtained
by subtracting from each pixel its estimate obtained us-
ing a pixel predictor from the pixel’s immediate neighbor-
hood. SRM uses 45 different pixel predictors of two differ-
ent types: linear and non-linear. Each linear predictor is a
shift-invariant finite-impulse response filter described by a
kernel matrix K(pred). The residual Z = (zkl) is a matrix of
the same dimension as X:
Z = K(pred) ∗X −X ∆= K ∗X (8)
where the symbol ∗ denotes the convolution with X mirror-
padded so that K ∗X has the same dimension as X .
An example of a simple linear residual is zij = Xi,j+1 −
Xi,j , which is the difference between a pair of horizon-
tally neighboring pixels. In this case, the residual kernel is
K = ( −1 1 ), which means that the predictor estimates
the pixel value as its horizontally adjacent pixel.
All non-linear predictors in the SRM are obtained by tak-
ing the minimum or maximum of up to five residuals ob-
tained using linear predictors. For example, one can predict
pixel Xi,j from its horizontal or vertical neighbors, obtain-
ing thus one horizontal and one vertical residual Z(h) =(
zhij
)
, Z(v) =
(
zvij
)
:
z
(h)
ij = Xi,j+1 −Xi,j (9)
z
(v)
ij = Xi+1,j −Xi,j (10)
Using these two residuals, one can compute two nonlinear
“minmax” residuals as:
z
(min)
ij = min
{
z
(h)
ij , z
(v)
ij
}
(11)
z
(max)
ij = max
{
z
(h)
ij , z
(v)
ij
}
(12)
After that, quantize Z with a quantizer Q−T,T with cen-
troids Q−T,T = {−Tq, (−T + 1) q, . . . , T q}, where T > 0
is an integer threshold and q > 0 is a quantization step:
rij
∆
= Q−T,T (zij) ,∀i, j (13)
The next step in forming the SRM feature vector in-
volves computing a co-occurrence matrix of fourth order,
C(SRM) ∈ Q4−T,T , from four (horizontally and vertically)
neighboring values of the quantized residual rij from the
entire image:
CSRMd0d1d2d3 =
m,n−3∑
i,j=1
[ri,j = dk,∀k = 0, . . . , 3] (14)
where [B] is the Iverson bracket, which is equal to 1 when
the statementB is true and to 0 when it is false. The union of
all co-occurrence matrices, including their differently quan-
tized versions, has a total dimension of 34671.
Features Enhancement
The above methods of extracting steganalysis features do not
consider the location of modified pixels caused by adversar-
ial attacks. Obviously, the accuracy of detection will be im-
proved if we assign larger weight to the features of modified
location. Although we cannot obtain the accurate modified
location, we can estimate the relative modification probabil-
ity of each pixel. In order to further improve the accuracy
of detection, we propose to enhance steganalysis features by
estimating the probability of modifications caused by adver-
sarial attacks.
We take advantage of the gradient amplitude to estimate
the modification probability because the pixels with larger
gradient amplitude have larger probability to be modified.
Assume that the neural network divides images into N cat-
egories. Although we cannot know which target class will
be selected by the attacker, we can randomly select L cate-
gories to generate L targeted adversarial examples and then
estimate the modification probability of each pixel accord-
ing to these targeted adversarial examples. So we take the
ith (1 ≤ i ≤ L) class as the target class to calculate the gra-
dient of the input image X . We refer to the matrix of all
pixels’ modification probabilities as Modification Probabil-
ity Map (MPM). Note that these targeted adversarial exam-
ples generated by us are only used to estimate MPM which
can be used to detect untargeted attacks.
For FGSM and IGSM, when generating the adversar-
ial example of the target class yi for the input image,
we save absolute values of the gradient of each pixel
|∇XJ(X, yi)|, and then normalize them to obtain the gradi-
ent map fnor (|∇XJ(X, yi)|) where fnor () is the function
to normalize all elements in the matrix to (0, 1). Finally, cal-
culate the mean value of the gradient maps of L adversarial
examples to get MPM P :
P =
1
L
L∑
i=1
fnor (|∇XJ(X, yi)|) (15)
P is a m× n matrix in which the (i, j) th element Pi,j is
the modification probability of the (i, j) th pixel Xi,j .
For C&W which does not generate adversarial examples
by gradient, the estimation of MPM starts by computing the
difference array Di between the normal image X and the
adversarial example Xadvi :
Di = X
adv
i −X (16)
Then save the absolute values of all elements in the differ-
ence array Di and normalize them to obtain the difference
map fnor (|Di|). Finally, calculate the mean value of the dif-
ference maps of L adversarial examples to get MPM:
P =
1
L
L∑
i=1
fnor (|Di|) (17)
For Deepfool which can only generate untargeted adver-
sarial examples, we estimate MPM by computing the differ-
ence array D between the normal image X and the adver-
sarial example Xadv:
D = Xadv −X (18)
Then save the absolute values of all elements in the differ-
ence array D and normalize them to obtain MPM:
P = fnor (|D|) (19)
The above description is the estimation of MPM based on
normal images. In practice, the detector may receive an ad-
versarial example. The results of our experiments show that
the MPM of one normal image and its adversarial image is
quite similar. Figure 1 shows an example of a normal image,
an adversarial image and their MPM (normalized to (0, 255)
to show more clearly).
Enhanced SPAM Considering the impact of MPM, En-
hanced SPAM (ESPAM) is proposed. The difference be-
tween SPAM and ESPAM is that we construct a new Markov
transition probability based on MPM. For example, in the
horizontal direction, the Markov transition probability M→x,y
is related to the pixel Xi,j , Xi,j+1 and Xi,j+2. So we cal-
culate the new Markov transition probability M ′→x,y in this
way:
M ′→x,y =M
→
x,y · Pi,j · Pi,j+1 · Pi,j+2 (20)
Similarly, for the second-order detecting features, the new
Markov transition probability M ′→x,y,z is
M ′→x,y,z =M
→
x,y,z · Pi,j · Pi,j+1 · Pi,j+2 · Pi,j+3 (21)
Then the expression of the average sample Markov transi-
tion probability matrices is
F1,...,k = (M
′→ +M ′← +M ′↑ +M ′↓)/4
Fk+1,...,2k = (M
′↗ +M ′↙ +M ′↘ +M ′↖)/4
(22)
where k = (2T + 1)2 for the first-order detecting features
and k = (2T + 1)3 for the second-order detecting features.
ESPAM has the same dimensionality as SPAM, which is
686.
Enhanced SRM The Enhanced Spatial Rich Model
(ESRM) is built in the same manner as the SRM but the
process of forming the co-occurrence matrices is modified
to consider the impact of MPM:
CESRMd0d1d2d3 =
m,n−3∑
i,j=1
max
k=0,...,3
Pi,j+k [ri,j = dk,∀k = 0, . . . , 3]
(23)
Above,C(ESRM) denotes the enhanced version of the co-
occurrence C(SRM). In other words, instead of increasing
the corresponding co-occurrence bin by 1, the maximum of
the modification probabilities taken across the four residu-
als is added to the bin (Denemark et al. 2014). Thus, if a
group has four pixels with small modification probabilities,
it has smaller effect on the co-occurrence values than the
group with at least one pixel likely to be changed. The rest
of the process of forming ESRM stays exactly the same with
SRM. ESRM has the same dimensionality as SRM, which is
34671.
Training Detector
The construction of our detectors based on features relies
on pattern-recognition classifiers. The detectors are trained
as binary classifiers implemented using the FLD ensemble
(Kodovsky, Fridrich, and Holub 2012) with default settings.
The ensemble by default minimizes the total classification
error probability under equal priors. The random subspace
dimensionality and the number of base learners is found by
minimizing the out-of-bag estimate of the testing error on
bootstrap samples of the training set as it is an unbiased es-
timate of the testing error on unseen data (Breiman 1996).
Experimental Results
We construct the detectors by modeling the differences be-
tween adjacent pixels in natural images. Therefore, our
method can not achieve very good performance on MNIST
and CIFAR-10 because the size of the image is too small.
However, it has good performance on ImageNet-1000. Pre-
vious work showed that untargeted attack is easier to suc-
ceed, results in smaller perturbations, and transfers better to
different models. So we detect untargeted adversarial exam-
ples to see the performance of our method.
We test our detecting method against untargeted attacks
by FGSM, IGSM, Deepfool and C&W. Our experiments
are performed on 40000 images randomly selected from
ImageNet-1000 (ILSVRC-2016) using a pretrained VGG-
16 model (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014) as classification
network which is evaluated with top-1 accuracy. This results
(a) Normal image (b) MPM of normal image (c) Adversarial image (d) MPM of adversarial image
Figure 1: Illustrations of a normal image, an adversarial image and their MPM.
Table 1: Detection accuracy of normal images and their ad-
versarial images generated by FGSM.
SPAM  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
normal images 0.9488 0.9570 0.9651 0.9713
adversarial images 0.9432 0.9559 0.9628 0.9709
ESPAM  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
normal images 0.9725 0.9758 0.9812 0.9868
adversarial images 0.9704 0.9719 0.9751 0.9806
SRM  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
normal images 0.9757 0.9814 0.9831 0.9887
adversarial images 0.9785 0.9822 0.9861 0.9903
ESRM  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
normal images 0.9809 0.9839 0.9900 0.9931
adversarial images 0.9811 0.9866 0.9905 0.9938
RBF-SVM  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
normal images 0.8340 0.8913 0.9305 0.9487
adversarial images 0.8258 0.8936 0.9243 0.9541
Table 2: Detection accuracy of normal images and their ad-
versarial images generated by IGSM.
SPAM  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
normal images 0.9402 0.9485 0.9559 0.9606
adversarial images 0.9411 0.9474 0.9545 0.9601
ESPAM  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
normal images 0.9708 0.9737 0.9749 0.9760
adversarial images 0.9638 0.9675 0.9725 0.9745
SRM  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
normal images 0.9667 0.9706 0.9753 0.9802
adversarial images 0.9697 0.9724 0.9762 0.9812
ESRM  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
normal images 0.9712 0.9754 0.9811 0.9878
adversarial images 0.9716 0.9767 0.9820 0.9879
RBF-SVM  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
normal images 0.7749 0.8660 0.9145 0.9362
adversarial images 0.7975 0.8752 0.9072 0.9330
Table 3: Detection accuracy of normal images and their ad-
versarial images generated by Deepfool.
normal images adversarial images
SPAM 0.8553 0.8481
ESPAM 0.8870 0.8629
SRM 0.9445 0.9491
ESRM 0.9498 0.9527
RBF-SVM 0.5838 0.6012
Table 4: Detection accuracy of normal images and their ad-
versarial images generated by C&W.
normal images adversarial images
SPAM 0.6957 0.6778
ESPAM 0.8025 0.8296
SRM 0.8814 0.9092
ESRM 0.9233 0.9341
RBF-SVM 0.5332 0.5187
in a train set of 25000 images, a validation set of 5000 im-
ages, and a test set of 10000 images. The values of pixels per
color channel of these 40000 images range from 0 to 255.
For IGSM, we use α = 1 to ensure that we change each
pixel by 1 on each step and  ≤ 8 where  is a parameter to
determine the perturbation size. For Deepfool, we apply the
l2 norm version. For C&W, we set κ = 0. In the process of
estimating MPM, we set L = 100.
At first, the 40000 images from ImageNet-1000 are clas-
sified by the network to obtain their true labels. Then we use
these 40000 images to generate 40000 adversarial images as
adversarial samples of our experiments. To prove that MPM
is effective when detecting adversarial examples, we per-
form comparative experiments. We construct two pairs of
detectors: SPAM and ESPAM, SRM and ESRM. The only
difference between each pair is one detector with MPM and
the other detector without MPM. All detectors are trained
and tested on the same adversarial method.
Carlini & Wagner (Carlini and Wagner 2017a) point out
that it is necessary to evaluate defenses using a strong at-
tack on harder datasets (such as Imagenet). Moreover, Car-
lini & Wagner prove that using a second neural network to
identify adversarial examples is the least effective defense.
Therefore we only compare our method with the defense
which is effective for C&W on Imagenet and not based on
another neural network. However, Li’s defense (Li and Li
2017) fails against the C&W attack. The Hendrycks defense
(Hendrycks and Gimpel 2016) is only effective for MNIST.
Grosse’s (Grosse et al. 2017), Gong’s (Gong, Wang, and Ku
2017) and Metzen’s (Metzen et al. 2017) defenses use a sec-
ond neural network to classify images as normal or adver-
sarial. Lu’s defense (Lu, Issaranon, and Forsyth 2017) has
good performance on Imagenet even though its performance
against C&W is not evaluated. Finally we compare our de-
tectors with Lu’s defense which is denoted as RBF-SVM.
The experimental results of detecting adversarial exam-
ples are shown in Table 1 − 4. The data of Table 1 − 4 is
the detection accuracy of normal images and adversarial im-
ages. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate these detectors’ per-
formance by averaging the accuracy of detecting normal im-
ages and adversarial images. First of all, the results reveal
that the detectors with MPM have higher detection accuracy.
Moreover, MPM has stronger enhancing effect on SPAM
than SRM. When detecting FGSM and IGSM, ESPAM even
has comparable performance as SRM. That is to say, we can
even use the low-dimensional model to achieve comparable
performance as the high-dimensional model via the enhanc-
ing method. Experimental results show that it is difficult to
detect adversarial examples generated by the C&W method.
RBF-SVM is almost invalid against C&W. SPAM and SRM
achieve relatively low accuracy when detecting C&W. How-
ever, MPM improves SPAM by more than 15 percent and the
detection accuracy of ESRM reaches 93 percent on detect-
ing adversarial examples yielded by C&W. In addition, the
detection accuracy of ESRM is the highest when detecting
FGSM, IGSM, Deepfool and C&W. However, the compu-
tation time of SRM and ESRM is much longer because of
their high-dimensional features.
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Figure 2: Average detection accuracy for detectors against
FGSM.
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Figure 3: Average detection accuracy for detectors against
IGSM.
Conclusions
Inspired by the insight of Goodfellow et al. (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) that “adversarial examples can
be thought of as a sort of accidental steganography”, we pro-
pose to apply steganalysis to detecting adversarial examples.
We also propose a method to enhance steganalysis features.
The experimental results show that the enhanced scheme can
accurately detect various kinds of adversarial attacks includ-
ing the C&W method. Moreover, the secondary adversarial
attacks (Carlini and Wagner 2017a) cannot be directly per-
formed to our method because the structure of our detection
model is not a neural network. Therefore an open problem
is how to implement secondary attacks on our proposed de-
fense method.
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